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TO  T H E  M I N I S T RY  O F  F I N A N C E 
On 12 May 2017, the Ministry of Finance appointed a working group to assess the development 
needs in central government debt management, to prepare the necessary recommendations for 
developing the process and to submit the recommendations to the Ministry of Finance. The term of 
the working group started on 30 August 2017 and ended on 1 September 2018.
Assignment of the working group
The assignment of the working group was to assess 
 − target setting in central government debt management
 − the debt management model used by the State Treasury, which is based on a 
benchmark portfolio, and its workability, transparency and effectiveness 
 − management of interest rate risks and liquidity risks, considering the rapid 
growth in implicit liabilities in recent years 
 − institutional functioning of the currently used debt management model, divi-
sion of tasks in it and the resources allocated to it 
 − debt management steering within the Ministry of Finance 
 − resilience of debt management and continuity management of the process.
Setting up the working group and organising the work
Antti Suvanto, Doctor of Social Sciences, was invited to chair the working group. The members of 
the working group were: Eeva Grannenfelt, Managing Partner, Grannenfelt Finance Oy; Marjaana 
Hohti, Principal Adviser, Bank of Finland; Pauli Kariniemi, Financial Counsellor, Ministry of Finance; 
and Risto Murto, President and CEO, Varma Mutual Pension Insurance Company. Leena Mörttinen, 
Director General of the Financial Markets Department of the Ministry of Finance served as a 
working group member from 9 November 2017. Sami Napari, Senior Adviser in the Ministry of 
Finance, served as the secretary of the working group. 
Deputy Director Mika Arola, Director of Finance Teppo Koivisto and Deputy Director Juha 
Savolainen from the State Treasury served as permanent experts of the working group. 
The working group met 16 times during its term. 
The working group consulted the following persons as experts at its meetings: Jussi 
Tuulisaari, Financial Manager and Anna von Knorring, Deputy Director, State Treasury; 
Timo Ankelo, Partner, KPMG Oy; Petri Viertiö, CRO, Danske Bank A/S; Timo Laitinen, 
Director General, State Treasury; Helena Tarkka, Director of Administrative Governance 
and Development in the Ministry of Finance; Arto Eno, Financial Counsellor; Ministry of 
Finance; Anu Sammallahti, Deputy Director, State Treasury; Tuija Taos, Director General, 
Financial Stability Authority; and Martti Hetemäki, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of 
Finance.
Pirre Laaksonen, Assistant, Legal Affairs, in the Ministry of Finance, also assisted the 
working group in its work. 
As part of its task, the working group also examined the approaches of other countries in 
the management of central government debt. Concerning this, Mikko-Waltteri Sihvola, a 
university trainee from the Uppsala University, prepared an international comparison of 
the organisation of debt management. The chair and the secretary of the working group 
also visited Denmark where they familiarised themselves with the Danish organisation of 
central government debt management. 
The working group is unanimous in its recommendations and respectfully submits its 
memorandum to the Ministry of Finance.
Helsinki 31 August 2018
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Abstract
Central government debt management comprises central government borrowing, 
investment of central government cash funds, and the management of the risks associated 
with the debt and the invested cash funds and the management of the risks arising from 
their management. These debt office tasks are currently performed by the State Treasury. 
Within the State Treasury, debt management is the responsibility of the agency’s Finance 
Division. The Finance Division also has other tasks, such as the administration of central 
government lending, interest subsidies and guarantees granted from central government 
funds. 
The current organisational model for central government debt management was 
introduced in 1999. The amount of Finland’s central government debt and the  contingent 
financial liabilities of the State of Finland have doubled since the financial crisis. This 
means that the euro-denominated risks associated with central government debt 
servicing have increased accordingly . At the same time, the tasks of the State Treasury 
have become more diverse. The State Treasury has become a service and development 
agency that, in addition to providing central government with financing services, also 
produces financial and human resources management services, as well as compensation 
and benefit services for citizens and corporations. The State Treasury is also a partner 
in the development of knowledge-based management and the digitalisation of central 
government. 
There have also been substantial changes in the operating environment of debt 
management after 1999. With the introduction of the euro, the division into domestic 
and foreign borrowing became irrelevant, and the exchange rate risk has disappeared 
almost completely. The investor base is international and most of the issues are carried out 
through international primary dealer banks. 
Since the financial crisis, regulation of the financial markets has been tightened and 
more attention is now paid to such matters as the governance of financial institutions. 
The monetary policy has also shaped the operating environment as money market 
interest rates have fallen to zero or below it and as central banks have, as a result of the 
12
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quantitative easing of the monetary policy, become important buyers of government 
bonds in the secondary market.
As all other areas of financing, debt management is crucially dependent on information 
systems and their operational reliability. For actors in the financial sector, ICT is part of 
their core business and not merely a support function. Rapid development and increasing 
vulnerability of information systems (including cyber security threats) have led to higher 
operational risks in debt management.
As a multi-sectoral agency, the State Treasury is steered on a multi-channel basis. The 
steering is coordinated by the Administrative Governance and Development Department 
of the Ministry of Finance, which is also responsible for the process. Decisions on the 
allocation of the agency’s resources are made by its Director General within the budgetary 
framework granted by the Ministry of Finance. The ministry does not play any role in the 
allocation of resources within the State Treasury. 
The ministry’s other departments take part in the performance management process in 
accordance with their own core sectors. Central government debt management strategy is 
the responsibility of the ministry’s Financial Markets Department. The Ministry of Finance 
sets out the overall principles guiding debt management, the financial instruments used 
in debt management, as well as the risk limits applied in the process. 
Organising central government debt management as part of the operations of the multi-
sectoral State Treasury is problematic for several reasons. 
Multi-channel steering is one of the problems. In the performance management process, 
the tasks of the State Treasury are seen as parallel duties even though they are very 
different in nature. Debt management is an operative function, which involves high 
monetary values. The objectives laid out for the State Treasury’s Finance Division do 
not come from the same channel as the resources allocated to the operations. In such a 
structure, only limited consideration can be given to the needs of a debt office, especially 
when decisions on information system investments are made. There are not many 
synergies between the Finance Division and the other functions of the agency either. 
The issue of multi-tier organisation of the ICT solutions used in debt management 
is related to the above. Debt management does not have any ownership in the ICT 
architecture that it needs. When problems arise, matters have to be managed through 
intermediaries, which causes delays in the process. The same applies to development 
and investment projects. Moreover, development and investment projects must compete 
with development projects of other State Treasury divisions, which also causes delays 
and increases the risks associated with the implementation of the projects. All this means 
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that the organisation and management of the ICT solutions used in debt management 
constitute an operational risk to central government debt management. 
The third problem is associated with administration and supervision. The supervision of 
the State Treasury’s debt management operations is the responsibility of the agency’s 
internal audit, which reports on its work to the Director General. The Financial Markets 
Department of the Ministry of Finance is the external supervisor of the process. The 
National Audit Office of Finland is responsible for the external financial and performance 
audits of the agency. This practice differs from what is normally applied in the financial 
sector. In the financial sector, reporting on internal audits is normally on the basis of the 
one-over-one principle, in which the critical audit observations are submitted directly to 
the Board or the Board-appointed Audit Committee, bypassing the senior management. In 
the debt management performed by the State Treasury, this would mean direct reporting 
to the Financial Markets Department of the Ministry of Finance. Especially in the field 
of risk management and ICT dependency, central government debt management is 
comparable to financial sector operations in general.
On the basis of this, the working group recommends that 
debt management and the steering of central government transactions should be 
transferred to a separate debt office that could operate as a separate agency or as a 
separate unit in the Ministry of Finance. At the same time, a single-channel steering 
system would be adopted. In the system, the Ministry of Finance would continue to 
decide on the debt management strategy and provide the debt office with a budgetary 
framework. The debt office should have direct ownership in and steering control over 
the ICT architecture it uses (work stations, data communications, servers, outsourced 
services and contractual management). 
The working group also considered a third option: placing the debt office under the 
auspices of the Bank of Finland. This could provide synergy benefits as the expertise and 
information systems used by the central bank would also be partially available to the debt 
office. For example, back office functions could be managed using shared resources. The 
debt office operates under the auspices of the central bank in such countries as Denmark, 
Iceland and Norway. In these countries, the arrangement can also be justified with the 
fact that their central banks use foreign currency-denominated borrowing to maintain 
foreign currency reserves. However, there are no euro area countries where the debt 
office operates under the auspices of the central bank. Placing the debt office under the 
auspices of the central bank is poorly compatible with the fact that for monetary policy 
reasons, a large proportion of central government debt is in the possession of the central 
bank. 
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Transferring the tasks of the debt office to a separate agency or a separate unit operating 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance would require legislative changes. 
Irrespective of the solution, the working group 
considers it important that, as applicable, the principles commonly used in the 
financial sector should also be used in the  governance of the debt office. The debt 
office should have an audit committee with a mandate to assess the risk management 
of and reporting on debt management and whether they are comparable with the 
standards commonly applied in the financial sector. The audit committee should have 
representatives of the ministry and some external financial sector experts as members. 
Implementing the recommendations issued by the audit committee would remain the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance.
The risk management methods used by the State Treasury’s Finance Division are up to 
date and comparable with the good practices applied in other countries. The interest 
rate risk is the principal risk in central government debt management. The estimates of 
the interest rate risk are produced with a model based on the estimation and simulation 
of the yield curve, which can be used to calculate the expected interest expenses and 
the distribution of the expenses. The maximum deviation of the interest expenses from 
expected expenses at desired probability (Cost-at-Risk) can be calculated on this basis. An 
effective frontier, which describes the amount by which a reduction in interest expense 
variation would increase the expected expenses under the modelling, can be calculated 
on the basis of the model. The Ministry of Finance selects the interest rate risk position 
that is in accordance with its risk preferences from these expense/risk ratios and includes it 
in the debt management guidelines issued to the State Treasury. 
The State Treasury’s Finance Division makes active use of interest rate swaps to adjust 
debt duration (repricing). This allows the State Treasury to separate interest rate risk from 
refinancing risk. Shortening debt duration by means of interest rate swaps has helped to 
lower average interest expenses. In a situation where short-term interest rates are close 
to or below zero, it has been more difficult to estimate and interpret the yield curve. The 
working group is of the view that 
advanced methods should be used in the estimation of the interest rate risk and that the 
methods should be reviewed from time to time. Financial research experts should take 
part in the review process. First, it should be assessed how the consideration of the zero 
lower bound would impact the estimation of the interest rate risk and expected interest 
expenses. 
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In an estimate of the interest rate risk that is solely based on the interest expenses of 
central government debt and their statistical variation, no consideration is given to the 
possible joint variation of the interest expenses and the central government interest 
income from financial claims or expected tax revenue. Such a broad-based approach 
in which the focus is on the total central government balance sheet would shift the 
attention from the variation in expected interest expenses to the variation in the deficits 
and surpluses of the state budget as a whole. The adoption of such a broad-based 
balance sheet perspective has been examined in a number of countries. It has also been 
recommended by international organisations. However, New Zealand is the only country 
that has adopted this approach. Complexity and problems with access to information 
have made the broad-based balance sheet model less attractive. The working group is of 
the view that 
a broad-based balance sheet perspective in which consideration is given to both 
debt interest expenses and the joint variation of these expenses between tax revenue 
and other revenue generated by balance sheet items is the right approach to the risk 
management of central government as a whole. The working group recommends that 
the extent that such a central government-level balance sheet perspective would be 
feasible and realistically possible should be examined. 
16
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1  Introduction
With the rapid growth in central government debt and implicit central government 
liabilities, central government debt management has assumed an increasingly important 
role in recent years. At the same time, the requirements arising from financial market 
regulation have become more comprehensive and technological advances have made the 
ICT infrastructure a strategically important part of debt management and its functioning 
is a critical factor in all situations. As a result of such factors as growing cyber threats, 
continuity management has also assumed an increasingly important role in central 
government debt management. These background factors, together with the fact that 
two decades have passed since the last comprehensive audit of central government debt 
management and its organisation,1  make it essential to assess the development needs in 
central government debt management. 
The working group had a broad mandate. Its task was to assess 
1. the target setting in central government debt management
2. the debt management model used by the State Treasury, which is 
based on a benchmark portfolio, and its workability, transparency 
and effectiveness
3. management of interest rate risks and liquidity risks, considering the 
rapid growth in implicit liabilities in recent years 
4. institutional functioning of the current debt management model, 
division of tasks in it and the resources allocated to it
5. debt management steering function within the Ministry of Finance
6. resilience of debt management and continuity management in the 
process.
1  The current division of tasks in central government debt management is based on the recommendations issued 
in 1997 by the VMVK working group comprising Ministry of Finance and State Treasury experts (Ministry of Finance 
1997). In 2008, the National Audit Office of Finland carried out an audit of the organisation of central government 
debt management. According to the National Audit Office, the procedures applied to central government debt 
management in Finland are in accordance with the best international practices.
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The organisation of the debt management and cash management of on-budget entities, 
and the steering and risk management of this process were set out as the priority areas 
in the mandate of the working group.2  A more detailed analysis of the total central 
government balance sheet was left outside the scope of the working group’s mandate. 
The main changes in the operating environment of debt management are described 
in Chapter 2 of the report. Central government liabilities and financial assets, the 
unconventional monetary policy pursued in recent years, changes in the regulatory 
environment and information security are discussed in the chapter. Overall organisation of 
debt management in Finland, the multi-channel steering process of the State Treasury, the 
general organisational model of the agency, and the organisation of debt management 
as part of the State Treasury’s Finance Division are discussed in Chapter 3. Organisation of 
debt management in different countries is described in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains an 
overall description of the risks associated with debt management, while in Chapter 6, the 
focus is on the management of the interest rate risk, the key risk in debt management, and 
the selection of the strategic interest rate risk position. In Chapter 7, the working group 
sums up its key observations on central government debt management. In conclusion, 
the working group presents its recommendations for reorganising the debt management 
process and for developing risk management. 
2  In a number of countries, these tasks are managed by a separate government debt office. In Finland, this 
function is the responsibility of the State Treasury.
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2  Changes in the operating environment 
of debt management
2.1  Central government debt and contingent financial 
liabilities
In this report, central government debt means the debt managed by the State Treasury 
(= on-budget debt). On-budget entities mean the ministries and agencies operating in 
central government administrative branches. This debt concept differs from the EDP debt 
concept (Excessive Deficit Procedure), used by Statistics Finland, which describes the 
general government debt position.3 
In absolute terms and in relation to the national economy, central government debt 
has grown substantially over the past ten years (Figure 1). In 2008, Finland’s central 
government debt totalled slightly more than EUR 50 billion. In 2016, it already exceeded 
the EUR 100 billion mark.4 Even though the debt has grown, there has been no growth in 
interest expenses during the period in review (Figure 2). This is because of the historically 
low interest rates. The rapid growth in the amount of debt has nevertheless heightened 
the potential impacts of the market risks associated with central government debt 
(especially the interest rate risk) on central government finances. 
In addition to direct central government indebtedness, the risks associated with debt 
management are also heightened by a rapid increase in government guarantees over 
the past ten years (Figure 3). According to the figures reported by the State Treasury, 
government guarantees 5 totalled about EUR 23 billion in 2010, whereas at the end of 
2017, they already amounted to about EUR 52 billion. 
3 For more information on the differences between these two debt concepts, visit the State Treasury website on 
central government debt, at http://www.treasuryfinland.fi/en-US/Statistics/Central_government_debt.
4 The whole debt has been in euros since 2007. In 2003, about EUR 1.2 billion of the debt was still in foreign 
currencies.
5 Government guarantee refers to a legal commitment by the state to assume liability for the debt of another 
par ty. Government collateral meanwhile is a legal commitment to compensate for the losses arising from certain 
activities.  
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Figure 1. On-budget debt 
Source: State Treasury.
Figure 2. On-budget interest expenses
Source: State Treasury.
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There has been a particularly strong growth in the liabilities associated with the debt crisis 
of the euro area member states and, domestically, in the export financing liabilities for 
Finnvera. There has also been a substantial increase in liabilities associated with central 
government funds, most of which are liabilities of the National Housing Fund. 
Figure 3. Government guarantees 
Source: State Treasury.
In reality, the central government liabilities are more substantial than described above. For 
example, through its pension scheme, the State of Finland has given a pension pledge to 
current and former central government employees, which totalled EUR 93 billion at the 
end of 2017.6 The State of Finland also has pension liabilities through the self-employed 
persons’ pension scheme. Moreover, Finland’s share of the callable capital within the 
framework of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is slightly more than EUR 11 billion. 
This liability would become at least partially payable if the ESM became insolvent or if its 
reserve fund and the capital already paid are insufficient to cover the losses. For a more 
comprehensive description of the direct and contingent financial  liabilities of central 
government, see the risk report published each year by the Ministry of Finance.7 
Determining which factors have led to an increase in contingent financial liabilities of 
central government is a relevant topic but nevertheless outside the scope of this report. 
This issue is also discussed in the risk report published by the Ministry of Finance. 
6 Of the method used in the calculation of central government pension liabilities, see the financial statements of 
the State Pension Fund (VER) (2017, Annex 10.2).
7 The latest report was published in June 2018 (Ministry of Finance 2018).
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The risks associated with the growth in contingent financial liabilities of central 
government and their potential negative impacts on central government debt 
management are mitigated by the funds accumulated for them. For example, losses 
arising from export guarantees provided to promote Finnish exports can be primarily 
covered from the fund for export guarantee and special guarantee operations in Finnvera’s 
balance sheet and secondarily from the State Guarantee Fund. 
Finland is not the only country facing an indebtedness challenge as a rapid growth in 
debt-to-GDP ratios has been a global phenomenon in recent years. For more information 
about debt trends in Europe, see Figure 4. Since the start of the financial crisis in 2007, the 
general government debt-to-GDP ratio has grown in nearly all EU countries. However, in 
Finland, the rate of growth has been significantly faster than in Europe in general. Despite 
this, Finland’s general government debt-to-GDP ratio is still lower than in the rest of the EU 
on average. 
Figure 4. General government debt-to-GDP ratio in EU countries
Source: Eurostat 
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International comparisons of government guarantees are difficult because of differences 
between national reporting practices. However, in recent years, Eurostat has made 
substantial progress in its work to collect comparable material on contingent liabilities 
of EU Member States. Information on contingent liabilities of a number of EU countries 
as measured in guarantees is presented in Figure 5.8 Unlike with the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
the general government guarantee-to-GDP ratio is higher in Finland than in any other 
EU country. In the growth rate of the contingent  liabilities, Finland has been going 
against the prevailing trend. In most EU countries, general government guarantees as a 
proportion of the GDP have been shrinking in recent years, whereas in Finland they have 
been growing at a rapid rate. 
It is clear that state indebtedness also has an impact on central government debt 
management. Box 1 describes some of the factors highlighted by the OECD that should be 
considered in debt management in high-debt environments so that indebtedness-related 
risks can be mitigated and the consolidation of central government finances supported. 
Figure 5. General government guarantees in a number of EU countries
Source: Eurostat
8  Of the provisions and problems concerning the material, see Eurostat (2017).
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
%
 o
f G
DP
Denmark 
Germany
Spain
France
The Netherlands
Austria
Finland
Sweden
23
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE 2019:16 MEMORANDUM OF THE EXPERT WORKING GROUP ASSESSING DEVELOPMENT NEEDS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT DEBT MANAGEMENT
B OX  1.  C E N T R A L  G O V E R N M E N T  D E B T  M A N AG E M E N T  I N  A  H I G H - D E B T  E N V I R O N M E N T
Rapid growth in central government indebtedness in 
many countries has been one of the consequences of 
the financial crisis. The OECD has analysed the factors 
that should be considered in the management of central 
government debts and assets in this environment so that 
the risks associated with central government indebtedness 
can be mitigated and the consolidation of central 
government finances supported. Some of the factors 
highlighted by the OECD are listed below. Not all of them 
are relevant to Finland. The State Treasury can, for example, 
shorten the maturity of the debt portfolio by means of 
interest rate swaps without issuing short-term debt. Read 
more about utilising interest rate swaps in Box 7. 
Managing the costs and risks arising from the debt 
Debt structure 
Higher debt levels have made central government balance 
sheets more vulnerable, which highlights the careful 
selection of the risk position. Exceptionally low short-term 
interest rates encourage governments to issue short-term 
debt. At the same time, however, yields are at historically 
low levels throughout the interest rate curve, which serves 
as an encouragement to extend maturity and to fix interest 
expenses for longer periods. 
Debt in foreign currencies 
There was a slight increase in issues in foreign currencies 
in OECD countries during the financial crisis as debt 
offices made efforts to expand their investor base. Despite 
this, in most OECD countries, debt in foreign currencies 
only accounts for a small percentage of all debt issues. At 
the same time, however, foreign investors hold a large 
proportion of all debt in domestic currencies in many 
countries. As debt levels have risen, this has heightened the 
need for credible medium-term consolidation programmes 
aimed at  restructuring general government finances so 
that the risk of suddenly losing the trust of foreign investors 
as a result of an unsustainable general government fiscal 
position can be reduced. 
Index-linked debt instruments 
It is generally considered that the structure of the central 
government debt provides opportunities for hedging 
against macroeconomic shocks. From this perspective, an 
optimal central government financing strategy should 
depend on the shocks facing the economy and the 
structure of the economy. It is, however, extremely difficult 
to estimate the type of the shocks facing the economy and 
the manner in which the economy reacts to them. Issuing 
bonds that are index-linked to economic indicators, such 
as the price of oil or GDP, provides an alternative hedging 
method. In practice, however, only a very limited number 
of index-linked bonds have been issued. 
Maintaining price stability 
Rapid growth in indebtedness makes debt reduction 
through higher inflation an attractive option. According to 
the OECD, the macroeconomic costs of such a policy would, 
however, exceed its potential benefits and would be in 
conflict with the policy measures aimed at maintaining and 
strengthening market trust. Stable inflation expectations 
also reduce overall debt management costs. 
Management of central government assets 
In order to reduce the risks arising from indebtedness, 
countries should also consider the privatisation of specific 
central government assets. In particular, reducing state 
ownership should be considered in sectors with pro-
cyclical revenue. The privatisation programmes should be 
based on thorough cost-benefit analyses.
Comprehensive and transparent statistics on debts and 
assets 
Producing an overview of the risks associated with central 
government assets and liabilities and managing them 
require comprehensive and transparent statistics on them 
in different administrative branches.
By lowering risk premiums and refinancing risks, 
transparent and reliable statistics on assets and liabilities 
also make it easier to consolidate central government 
finances. 
Source: OECD (2012).
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2.2  Central government financial assets 
The State of Finland has substantial financial assets, which helps to mitigate the risks 
associated with central government debt. Over the past decade, central government 
financial assets have fluctuated between EUR 50 billion and EUR 65 billion (Figure 6). 
Domestic shares account for the largest proportion of this total constituting more than 
half of all central government financial assets. At the same time, liquid cash funds and 
deposits totalled about EUR 4 billion during the second quarter of 2017.9 In the Figure, the 
item ‘Other assets’ comprises investments in short-term and long-term debt instruments, 
derivatives and employee stock options, as well as other receivables, such as trade credit, 
advance payments and accrued income. 
Figure 6. Central government financial assets
Source: Statistics Finland, General government financial accounts.
Central government cash funds, the most liquid part of central government financial 
assets, is separately detailed in Figure 7. As shown in the Figure, there has been a decline 
in liquid cash funds and deposits since 2011. Based on its own liquidity assessments, the 
State Treasury has over the past few years reduced the size of the cash funds it manages. 
There are two factors behind this: the good funding capacity of the State of Finland and 
the adoption of liquidity-based cash management. See Chapter 5 for more information 
about liquidity management. 
9  There is substantial seasonal variation and variation within individual months in this item.
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In reality, central government assets are larger than the financial assets categorised by 
Statistics Finland and shown in Figure 6. The State of Finland also has financial assets 
allowing it to prepare for the payment of future pensions. The market value of the 
investments of the State Pension Fund totalled nearly EUR 19 billion at the end of last year. 
In addition to holding financial assets, the State of Finland also owns buildings, stocks 
and land areas. According to the financial accounts, the value of these real assets totalled 
about EUR 53 billion in 2015. 
Figure 7. Changes in central government cash funds 2005-2016, EUR million10 
Source: State Treasury 
2.3  Central bank policy 
Large central banks first reacted to the financial crisis which began in 2007 and the 
ensuing economic crisis by lowering central bank interest rates and by supporting the 
liquidity of banks and, finally, with securities purchase programmes. The central bank 
policy pursued over the past few years has shaped the overall operating environment of 
debt management. As a result of the action taken by central banks, short-term market 
rates have fallen below zero (Figure 8) and the government bond yields are at historical 
lows (Figure 9). This explains why the State of Finland pays less interest on its debt even 
though the amount of debt has increased. The differences between national interest rates 
have also narrowed since the worst crisis years. However, the differences in yields between 
10  Here cash funds mean the cash funds managed by the State Treasury, which differ slightly from the central 
government cash reserves considered in general government financial accounts. The units included in the two sets 
of figures are not the same, which explains the differences. The cash funds managed by the State Treasury is the key 
concept when central government liquidity and its management are considered.
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countries are still substantial, compared with the years preceding the financial crisis (1999-
2008). 
At the end of 2017, the book value of the bonds issued by euro area member states and 
held by the European Central Bank System totalled EUR 1,931 billion. Nearly 30 per cent 
of the bonds issued by the State of Finland had been entered in the balance sheet of the 
Bank of Finland. 
The possibility of the normalisation of central bank policy in the near future  has to be 
taken into account in debt management. As nominal interest rates increase, the interest 
expenses of the central government debt will inevitably also go up. This process may also 
involve substantial changes in the pricing of assets. In many European countries, debt-to-
GDP ratios remain high (Figure 4), which will increase the uncertainties associated with 
the normalisation. For example, in Italy, Portugal, Greece and Cyprus, the ratio is still over 
100 per cent. As general interest rate levels increase, interest expenses in these countries 
will grow more rapidly than elsewhere. This may also have an effect on the risk premiums 
of highly indebted countries, which in turn may have wider economic impacts in these 
countries. 
Figure 8. Euribor rates 
Source: Macrobond.
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Figure 9. Government bond yields (10 years) 
Source: Macrobond.
In addition to having an effect on market rates, the monetary policy pursued in recent 
years has also had a wide impact on the government bond market. One key aspect is the 
manner in which the central bank policy has impacted the liquidity of the government 
bond market. The OECD has analysed the theme on several occasions in recent years 
(OECD 2016, 2017 and 2018) and the contents of the analyses are summed up below: 
Liquidity of the government bond market is a critical issue for a number of reasons. 
Government bonds play an important role in the pricing of securities in general. The 
weakening liquidity of the government bond market has a negative impact on this 
process. From the perspective of the debt offices, weakening liquidity makes bond prices 
more sensitive to market risks, which will increase risk premiums and, consequently, lead 
to higher borrowing costs. Moreover, lower liquidity reduces the number of potential 
buyers, which will also increase borrowing costs. Weaker liquidity in the secondary market 
means higher expenses for initial issues in the primary market.
Theories suggest that the impacts of the monetary policy pursued in the past few years 
(especially the growing role of central banks as buyers of bonds) on the liquidity of bond 
markets are not unequivocal. At the same time, the quantitative easing by central banks 
may reduce investors’ liquidity premiums, which has a positive impact on market liquidity. 
However, the fact that central banks do not trade in bonds that they have purchased 
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in connection with quantitative easing weakens liquidity.11 Ultimately, the impact of a 
monetary policy on the liquidity of the government bond market is an empirical question.
The survey carried out by the OECD in 2017 gives a twofold picture of the changes in bond 
market liquidity. The OECD asked representatives of debt offices about their views of the 
secondary market liquidity. About 37 per cent of the respondents considered that liquidity 
had weakened, 30 per cent had not detected any changes, while 33 per cent were of the 
view that liquidity had improved. 
When asked about the factors impacting liquidity, the interviewees did not name any 
single factor with a particularly strong effect. Debt offices named the central bank policy 
pursued in the last few years and regulatory changes as the key factors behind the 
developments. 
The OECD has also surveyed how debt offices have reacted to the worries about the 
bond market liquidity. Debt offices have responded to the situation in a number of ways. 
They have given particular consideration to such issues as the regularity  of issuances in 
different maturities, supported existing benchmark bonds by using tap issues, arranged 
more frequent and smaller auctions, and used buy-back programmes. The reason for the 
last-mentioned approach is that, in general, the liquidity of bonds weakens as more time 
passes from the issue. 
11  After the launching of the purchasing programmes, central banks have supported the secondary market 
liquidity of government loans with securities lending programmes, in which central banks lend government bonds 
to market actors against other securities or (to a limited extent) against cash collateral.
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2.4  Changes in the regulatory environment after the financial 
crisis 
There have been major changes in the regulation of the financial markets in the years 
following the financial crisis. After 2008, the European Commission has proposed more 
than 50 legislative and non-legislative measures that have concerned such matters 
as capital and liquidity regulations for banks, a resolution framework and trading in 
derivatives.12 The purpose of the reforms has been to enhance the crisis resilience of 
banks and make operations more transparent. The ultimate aim has been to ensure the 
stability of the financial markets and, consequently, support real economic growth. Good 
governance has also been promoted through regulation.
Changes in the regulatory environment have had extensive impacts on banking 
operations and business models and they have been examined in a number of reports 
published over the last few years (for example, EBA 2015). The potential effects of 
regulatory changes on central government debt management have also been analysed. In 
2016, the OECD published the results of its survey in which debt offices gave their views 
on the impacts of the new regulatory environment on debt management. 
Representatives of debt offices have expressed their concern over the potential negative 
impacts of the new financial market regulation on government bond markets. According 
to most debt offices, the new regulation has meant higher transaction costs in the 
government bond secondary market. These costs will inevitably also be passed on to the 
primary market, leading to higher borrowing costs. 
The debt offices are also of the view that the regulatory changes will probably mean lower 
profits for primary dealers engaged in the government bond market, which will make 
the activity less attractive. This will have negative impacts on market liquidity and the 
demand for government bonds, especially in smaller countries. Box 2 contains information 
on the activities of primary dealers and their role in the management of Finland’s central 
government debt. 
12  For a list of the concluded regulatory projects and projects that are still in the negotiation stage, visit 
the European Commission website at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-
finance/financial-reforms-and-their-progress/progress-financial-reforms_fi
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B OX  2.  P R I M A RY  D E A L E R S  A N D  T H E I R  R O L E  I N  T H E  M A N AG E M E N T  O F 
F I N L A N D ’S  C E N T R A L  G O V E R N M E N T  D E B T  
The good tradeability of the euro-
denominated benchmark bonds (serial 
bonds) of the State of Finland in the 
secondary market is founded on the 
system of primary dealers. Such a system 
is typical of governmental issuers, and 
it distinguishes them from public and 
multinational financial vehicle corporations. 
The Finnish system of primary dealers was 
established during the recession of the 
1990s when central government borrowing 
requirements increased substantially and 
the Finnish government set up a system 
of primary dealers to ensure a smooth 
borrowing process. 
The State of Finland currently has 14 primary 
dealers.* The operations are guided by a 
primary dealer agreement, which is renewed 
each year. The rights and obligations of the 
banks acting as primary dealers that arise 
from their role are laid out in the agreement. 
Debt issues take place with primary dealers 
acting as brokers. Only banks designated 
as primary dealers may take part in 
government benchmark bond auctions. The 
principal organisers for the initial issues 
of new benchmark bonds are selected 
from among the primary dealer banks on 
the basis of performance indicators. The 
indicators are set so that the banks are in an 
optimal position to support the liquidity of 
the benchmark bonds, and the objectives 
laid out for fundraising, debt portfolio 
management and cash management. 
The primary dealer banks also have an 
obligation to quote bid and ask prices 
for the bonds in the secondary market. 
This is a key guarantee for secondary 
market liquidity and it also supports the 
pricing of the issues in the primary market. 
Considering the size of the debt, the 
secondary market liquidity of Finland’s 
euro-denominated benchmark bonds can 
be considered reasonable even though 
there have been some indications that it has 
weakened since 2015, a consequence of the 
exceptional monetary policy. 
In 2016, in a joint project of European debt 
offices, a (non-public) survey was carried 
out among the primary dealer banks in each 
country, and according to its findings, the 
model of primary dealers currently used 
in Finland is fundamentally sustainable. 
Based on the results, syndication was seen 
as an effective issuing method. In addition 
to regulation, the exceptional monetary 
policy was also considered to have reduced 
trading volumes. It was also reported that 
consignment stocks had decreased. 
* https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/en-US/
Funding_and_cash_management/Banks_
and_investors
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B OX  2.  P R I M A RY  D E A L E R S  A N D  T H E I R  R O L E  I N  T H E  M A N AG E M E N T  O F 
F I N L A N D ’S  C E N T R A L  G O V E R N M E N T  D E B T  
The good tradeability of the euro-
denominated benchmark bonds (serial 
bonds) of the State of Finland in the 
secondary market is founded on the 
system of primary dealers. Such a system 
is typical of governmental issuers, and 
it distinguishes them from public and 
multinational financial vehicle corporations. 
The Finnish system of primary dealers was 
established during the recession of the 
1990s when central government borrowing 
requirements increased substantially and 
the Finnish government set up a system 
of primary dealers to ensure a smooth 
borrowing process. 
The State of Finland currently has 14 primary 
dealers.* The operations are guided by a 
primary dealer agreement, which is renewed 
each year. The rights and obligations of the 
banks acting as primary dealers that arise 
from their role are laid out in the agreement. 
Debt issues take place with primary dealers 
acting as brokers. Only banks designated 
as primary dealers may take part in 
government benchmark bond auctions. The 
principal organisers for the initial issues 
of new benchmark bonds are selected 
from among the primary dealer banks on 
the basis of performance indicators. The 
indicators are set so that the banks are in an 
optimal position to support the liquidity of 
the benchmark bonds, and the objectives 
laid out for fundraising, debt portfolio 
management and cash management. 
The primary dealer banks also have an 
obligation to quote bid and ask prices 
for the bonds in the secondary market. 
This is a key guarantee for secondary 
market liquidity and it also supports the 
pricing of the issues in the primary market. 
Considering the size of the debt, the 
secondary market liquidity of Finland’s 
euro-denominated benchmark bonds can 
be considered reasonable even though 
there have been some indications that it has 
weakened since 2015, a consequence of the 
exceptional monetary policy. 
In 2016, in a joint project of European debt 
offices, a (non-public) survey was carried 
out among the primary dealer banks in each 
country, and according to its findings, the 
model of primary dealers currently used 
in Finland is fundamentally sustainable. 
Based on the results, syndication was seen 
as an effective issuing method. In addition 
to regulation, the exceptional monetary 
policy was also considered to have reduced 
trading volumes. It was also reported that 
consignment stocks had decreased. 
* https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/en-US/
Funding_and_cash_management/Banks_
and_investors
The surveys carried out among primary dealers also show that primary dealers are worried 
about the cumulative impacts of the new regulation (OECD 2016). According to the survey 
results, tighter capital requirements for banks may make primary dealers less interested in 
supplying liquidity  and market-making, which will have impacts on the functioning of the 
primary markets. 
The new regulatory environment has changed the issuing strategies, practices and 
techniques of the debt offices. Most of the debt offices interviewed by the OECD are 
now arranging debt auctions more frequently and some of the offices have introduced 
activities known as mini-tenders. In Finland, the regulatory changes have not yet had any 
impacts on debt issues. 
According to an OECD survey (OECD 2016), the Basel III framework reform is one of the 
regulatory changes that has caused particular concern in debt offices. In the debt offices’ 
view, the changes involving Basel III have potentially the most serious negative impacts on 
the primary market. 
The capital and solvency requirements contained in the Basel reform have led to a 
situation where correspondent banks have to finance a larger proportion of bond 
purchases with their own capital. From the banks’ perspective, this will increase the costs 
of market-making, which in turn will make the operations less profitable and attractive, 
especially with regard to large trading batches. Box 3 contains information about the key 
features of the Basel III framework. 
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B OX  3.  K E Y  F E AT U R E S  O F  T H E  B A S E L  I I I  F R A M E W O R K
The Basel Committee, which operates 
under the auspices of the European Union 
and the Bank for International Settlements, 
prepared changes to banking regulation 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The 
purpose was to correct inadequacies in 
the regulatory framework in effect before 
the crisis and to make the banking system 
more stable and more sustainable. The 
committee published the first part of the 
Basel III reforms in 2010. A supplementary 
regulatory package followed in 2017. 
One of the key changes in the Basel III 
reform is the requirement for a higher 
minimum capital adequacy ratio and 
higher-quality capital so that banks can be 
better prepared for unexpected losses. Core 
capital (Tier 1) must now account for at least 
six per cent (four per cent under the old 
system) of the bank’s risk-weighted assets, 
and at least 75 per cent of this capital must 
be of the highest quality (common stock, 
retained earnings). Supplementary capital 
requirements have been set for global 
systemically important banks. 
Basel III also means tighter capital 
requirements for market risks. To facilitate 
comparability and to increase risk sensitivity, 
there have also been changes to the 
standard methods used for calculating 
credit risk, market risk, CVA (credit valuation 
adjustment) and operational risk. Under 
the regulatory reform, there are also new 
restrictions on the use of banks’ own risk 
models. 
In order to prevent banks from 
accumulating excessive debts, it is also 
required under the Basel III framework that 
in internationally active banks, core capital 
must account for at least three per cent 
of the banks’ non-risk weighted assets. There 
are also additional requirements for global 
systemically important banks concerning 
their minimum capital adequacy ratio. 
The fourth set of reforms concerns liquidity 
improvements in banks. Under the reforms, 
a liquidity coverage ratio will be introduced 
and there will also be limits on liquid assets 
and restrictions concerning banks’ funding 
structures. Under the liquidity coverage 
ratio, banks must keep adequate amounts 
of highly liquid assets in their balance 
sheets. These assets must cover all short-
term liquidity obligations in a liquidity stress 
lasting for 30 days. In order to ensure that 
banks do not rely excessively on short-term 
funding, the Basel III reform also contains 
the requirement for a net stable funding 
ratio. 
The last major component in the Basel 
III package concerns the aim to balance 
the impacts of cyclical changes on 
banks’ lending. For this purpose, the 
reform contains the requirement for a 
countercyclical capital buffer under which 
banks must accumulate additional capital 
during periods of rapid economic growth so 
that they can release this capital when the 
economic cycle turns. In that case, banks 
can also provide loans for the real economy 
during periods of weaker growth. 
Sources: BIS (2018), Sarviharju (2016)
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The regulatory changes have both direct and indirect impacts, which makes it difficult 
to assess their overall effects. One example of this is MiFID II (Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive), which contains provisions on investor protection and the 
transparency of the trading in financial instruments. Even though the State Treasury does 
not have any trade reporting or other market reporting obligations as laid down in MiFID 
II, the changes resulting from the directive have, nevertheless, an indirect impact on 
central government fundraising. The key impacts concern extending trading transparency 
to the bonds issued by the State of Finland and the derivative instruments used in asset 
management. This may have an impact on the profitability of market-making concerning 
government benchmark bonds and, consequently, on their liquidity. 
Changes in the regulatory environment have also led to a lively debate on the financial 
market actors’ governance models and the key principles applied in them. A number of 
international organisations (such as the OECD, BIS and EBRD) have drawn up guidelines on 
the principles of good governance in the banking sector. As the State Treasury’s Finance 
Division is comparable with banks and special credit institutions, good banking sector 
practices (as adapted to the requirements of central government) should be reflected 
in the organisation of its governance. The recommendations of the Basel Committee for 
corporate governance principles in the banking sector are described in Box 4. 
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B OX  4.  R E CO M M E N D AT I O N S  O F  T H E  B A S E L  CO M M I T T E E  F O R  CO R P O R AT E 
G O V E R N A N C E  P R I N C I P L E S  I N  T H E  B A N K I N G  S E C TO R  
The Basel Committee has issued 
recommendations for corporate governance 
principles in credit institutions. The lessons 
learned from the financial crisis have been 
considered in the latest recommendations. A 
summary of the recommendations issued by 
the committee is given below. 
1. Board’s overall responsibilities 
The board has overall responsibility for the 
bank, including approving and overseeing 
management’s implementation of the bank’s 
strategic objectives, governance framework 
and corporate culture. 
The board is responsible for ensuring that 
the bank has a strong risk management 
framework. The board must play an active 
role when the bank’s risk appetite is defined. 
It must ensure the effectiveness of the risk 
management framework and internal audit 
functions. The board must also ensure that 
the bank operates in compliance with all 
regulations and statutes. 
2. Board qualifications and composition 
Board members should be and remain 
qualified, individually and collectively, for 
their positions. They should understand their 
oversight and corporate governance role and 
be able to exercise sound, objective judgement 
about the affairs of the bank. 
3. Board’s structure and practices 
The board should define appropriate 
governance structures and practices for its 
own work, and put in place the means for 
such practices to be followed and periodically 
reviewed for ongoing effectiveness. 
The definition of the governance structures 
includes the decision to establish 
committees, such as the audit committee. 
The board should conduct regular reviews 
of its own work, rules, committees and 
individual members. The chair of the board 
should be an independent or non-executive 
board member. 
The audit committee should be made up 
of independent or non-executive board 
members. The chair of the audit committee 
should not be the chair of the board or of 
any other committee. 
The tasks of the audit committee include 
the overseeing of the financial reporting 
process, interacting with the bank’s internal 
and external auditors, approving, or 
recommending to the board for its approval, 
the appointment, remuneration and 
dismissal of external auditors, reviewing and 
approving the audit scope and frequency, 
receiving key audit reports and ensuring 
that senior management is taking necessary 
corrective actions in a timely manner 
to address the inadequacies or cases of 
non-compliance identified by auditors 
and other control functions. The audit 
committee is also responsible for reviewing 
the third-party opinions on the design and 
effectiveness of the overall risk governance 
framework and internal audit system. 
4. Senior management 
Under the direction and oversight of the 
board, senior management should carry out 
and manage the bank’s activities in a manner 
consistent with the business strategy, risk 
appetite, remuneration and other policies 
approved by the board.
5. Governance of group structures 
In a group structure, the board of the parent 
company has the overall responsibility for the 
group and for ensuring the establishment and 
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operation of a clear governance framework 
appropriate to the structure, business and 
risks of the group and its entities. The board 
and senior management should know and 
understand the bank group’s organisational 
structure and the risks that it poses. 
6. Risk management function 
Banks should have an effective independent 
risk management function, under the 
direction of a chief risk officer (CRO), with 
sufficient stature, independence, resources 
and access to the board. 
7. Risk identification, monitoring and 
controlling 
Risks should be identified, monitored and 
controlled on an ongoing bank-wide and 
individual entity basis. The sophistication 
of the bank’s risk management and internal 
control infrastructure should keep pace 
with changes to the bank’s risk profile, to 
the external risk landscape and in industry 
practice. 
8. Risk communication 
An effective risk governance framework 
requires robust communication within the 
bank about risk, both across the organisation 
and through reporting to the board and senior 
management. 
9. Compliance 
The bank’s board of directors is responsible 
for overseeing the management of the bank’s 
compliance risk. The board should establish 
a compliance function and approve the 
bank’s policies and processes for identifying, 
assessing, monitoring and reporting on 
compliance risk. 
10. Internal audit 
The internal audit function should provide 
independent assurance to the board and 
should support board and senior management 
in promoting an effective governance process 
and the long-term soundness of the bank. 
Internal audit provides the board and senior 
management with independent information 
on the quality and effectiveness of the 
bank’s internal control, risk management 
and governance systems and processes. The 
internal audit function should have a clear 
mandate, be accountable to the board and 
be independent of the audited activities. 
In order to ensure independence, the 
internal audit function’s primary reporting 
line should be to the board, and its reports 
should be provided to the board without 
management filtering. 
11. Remuneration 
The bank’s remuneration structure should 
support sound corporate governance and risk 
management. 
12. Transparency 
The governance of the bank should be 
adequately transparent to its shareholders, 
depositors, other relevant stakeholders and 
market participants. 
13. The role of supervisors 
Supervisors should provide guidance for and 
supervise corporate governance at banks, 
including through comprehensive evaluations 
and regular interaction with boards and 
senior management. Supervisors should 
require improvement and remedial action as 
necessary, and should share information on 
corporate governance with other supervisors. 
Source: BIS (2015), KPMG (2015)
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2.5  Cyber security13 
As a result of technological advances, ICT architecture has become an inseparable part of 
the strategic core of financial market actors and it is critical to ensure its functioning in all 
circumstances. Growing knowledge intensity, closer integration between information and 
communications systems and more extensive use of open data networks have contributed 
to the wellbeing of citizens but at the same time, they have also given rise to new threats 
and risks. Cyber attacks aiming to paralyse the information and communications systems 
of companies or public sector actors may have significant negative impacts on business 
operations and the public sector. The costs arising from such interference may be 
substantial, not to mention the problems caused by a situation in which part of the critical 
infrastructure and essential services are disabled.
The phenomenon is particularly important from the perspective of the management of 
operational risks associated with government debt management. Information systems 
are core functions of debt management. Nowadays, debt is issued digitally and secondary 
market trading takes place at electronic market places. This highlights the reliability of key 
ICT solutions in debt risk and liquidity management. 
As operating environments have changed and technologies have become more 
sophisticated, cyber attacks and cyber crime have increased in the world. The actors 
behind them have also become more professional and nowadays they also include 
government-level players. For this reason, the threats facing the cyber domain have 
become increasingly destructive. 
Inevitably, these developments also impact Finland. In many respects, Finland is one 
of the most highly advanced information societies of the world and it is dependent on 
the functioning of electronic networks. This makes Finland an attractive target for cyber 
operations.
In fact, the information systems of Finland’s public administration and Finnish companies 
are continuously targeted by cyber attacks. Figure 10 contains information on the 
frequency of cyber attacks against central government between 2002 and 2015. In 2015, 
nearly 40 per cent of all central government organisations had experienced attacks 
in which malware had interfered with the use of information systems. At the same 
time, about 20 per cent of the organisations had detected attacks giving rise to special 
measures, while 10 per cent had experienced targeted attacks.
13  According to Finland's Cyber Security Strategy, cyber security means the desired end state in which the 
cyber domain is reliable and in which its functioning is ensured. Cyber domain means an electronic information 
processing domain comprising of one or several information technology infrastructures. Finnish Government 
(2013).
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The figure shows that cyber attacks against central government actors are fairly common 
and they constitute a serious threat to the continuity and uninterrupted functioning of the 
services. Central government information security and cyber experts have also pointed 
out that according to international studies, a growing proportion of all cyber attacks 
remain undetected. Thus, cyber attacks targeting central government are probably more 
common than indicated by Figure 10.
Figure 10. Frequency of cyber attacks targeting central government
Source: Ministry of Finance (2016, p. 36) 
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3  Organisation of central government 
debt management in Finland
3.1  Organisation of debt management before 1999
The last time the division of labour in central government debt management and the 
organisation of the process were extensively reviewed was in 1997. That year, the matter 
was examined by the VMVK working group chaired by Johnny Åkerholm, Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, and comprising representatives of the ministry 
and the State Treasury (Ministry of Finance 1997). 
The working group was appointed in a situation where, as a result of the introduction 
of the euro, advances in information technology and closer integration of the financial 
markets, the operating environment of the debt management was rapidly changing. It 
was therefore necessary to examine the workability of the existing organisational model in 
a changing environment. 
At the time, central government borrowing was based on an authorisation granted by 
Parliament, setting up the upper limit for the debt. Parliament authorised the Government 
to borrow, to conclude derivative contracts as part of risk management, and to delegate 
the borrowing and hedging to the Ministry of Finance and the State Treasury. 
Within the framework of this model, the Government authorised the Ministry of Finance 
to make decisions on the loans sought from international financial markets, whereas 
domestic fundraising was the responsibility of the State Treasury. The State Treasury was 
also responsible for the investment of cash funds and for government transactions. 
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The VMVK working group assessed the advantages and disadvantages of five different 
organisational models:
1. retaining the model used at the time 
2. transferring responsibility for all aspects of debt management to the 
Ministry of Finance 
3. transferring responsibility for all aspects of debt management to the 
State Treasury
4. establishing a separate debt office
5. outsourcing debt management to a body outside central government.
The working group was of the view that, as a result of substantial changes in the operating 
environment of debt management, the division of labour between the Ministry of Finance 
and the State Treasury had to be clarified so that the objectives set for debt management 
could be achieved. Based on an analysis carried out by the working group, it was 
concluded that the borrowing and asset management should be made the responsibility 
of a single body. The working group noted that there were good reasons for establishing 
a separate organisation but added that setting up such a body would take a great deal 
of time and generate additional administrative costs. This would also have been contrary 
to the general trend in central government towards larger administrative units, which 
reflected the drive for cost-efficiency.
In fact, the working group recommended that borrowing and the practical aspects of asset 
management should be transferred to the State Treasury. In the working group’s view, 
achieving the objectives set out for the change required that debt management functions 
should be clearly separated from other State Treasury functions and the activities should 
have a sufficiently high profile. This in turn also meant that more resources should be 
allocated to the activities. The model proposed by the working group was implemented in 
1999. 
3.2  Current organisation and steering of debt management 
Under the current debt management operating model, which was introduced in 1999, 
the State Treasury is responsible for the operational functions of central government 
borrowing and debt management, as recommended by the VMVK working group (Figure 
11). The sole task of the Ministry of Finance is to provide the State Treasury with strategic 
guidelines. 
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Figure 11. Current organisation of central government debt management 
Source: State Treasury.
Under the Ministry of Finance’s rules of procedure, the ministry’s Financial Markets 
Department is responsible for the steering of the core areas of debt management, 
prepares the matters that concern the strategic steering and supervision of central 
government borrowing, central government debt management and the investment of 
cash funds. At a practical level, strategic steering takes place on the basis of the guidelines 
on debt management approved by the Ministry of Finance. These guidelines include the 
general debt management principles and objectives, the instruments used, risk limits and 
other limitations, as well as the reporting responsibilities. 
Under the guidelines issued by the Ministry of Finance, the aim in central government 
debt management is to cover the borrowing needs of on-budget entities and minimise 
the costs arising from the debt in the long term at acceptable risk level. The risks refer to 
market risks, financing risks, credit risks, legal risks, operational risks and model risks. These 
risks are described in detail in Chapter 5. 
The debt management guidelines are reviewed each year. There are regular discussions on 
this matter during the year between the experts of the State Treasury’s Finance Division 
and the experts of the ministry’s Financial Markets Department. 
The debt management guidelines are also discussed in the steering meetings between 
the Financial Markets Department and the State Treasury’s Finance Division. The decisions 
on the guidelines are made by the Minister of Finance at the presentation of the 
Permanent Secretary. 
In addition to strategic steering, the Ministry of Finance is also tasked with supervising 
the implementation of central government debt management guidelines on the basis 
of the reporting by the State Treasury’s Finance Division. In addition to monthly risk and 
performance reports, the Finance Division also prepares more extensive tertial reports.
Section 82 of the 
Constitution 
of Finland 
‘The incurrence of 
State debt shall be based 
on the consent of the 
Parliament, which indicates 
the maximum level of new 
debt or the total level 
of State debt.’ 
Parliament
Parliament authorises 
the Government to borrow. 
Government
Ministry of 
Finance
The Ministry of Finance 
prepares borrowing and 
debt management guidelines 
for the State Treasury each year 
and supervises compliance 
with the guidelines. 
With Government authorisation, 
the Ministry of Finance grants 
the State Treasury the right to decide 
on borrowing and debt management 
and implement the decisions. 
The State Treasury reports on 
debt management 
to the Ministry of Finance 
each year. 
State Treasury
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3.3  General performance guidance of the State Treasury
In addition to debt management, the responsibilities of the State Treasury also include 
other central government development tasks (see section 3.4 on the tasks of the State 
Treasury) and for this reason, the agency’s performance guidance is on a multi-channel 
basis. The performance guidance is coordinated by the Administrative Governance and 
Development Department of the Ministry of Finance, which is also responsible for the 
process. Under the ministry’s rules of procedure, the Administrative Governance and 
Development Department  prepares the matters that concern the development and 
coordination of performance guidance in the ministry’s administrative branch, as well as 
operational and financial planning. The Administrative Governance and Development 
Department is also responsible for the steering and coordination of the administrative 
branch’s human resources, information management and premises, as well as other 
infrastructure matters. The ministry’s other departments (including the Financial Markets 
Department) mainly take part in the performance guidance process within the framework 
of the performance guidance of their own core areas. General performance guidance 
includes the preparation of the performance agreement between the Ministry of Finance 
and the State Treasury. 
Over the years, the State Treasury has developed into a multi-sectoral agency, which is 
responsible for a broad range of different tasks. This makes the general performance 
guidance of the agency a challenging and complicated process. The Ministry of Finance 
is not the only ministry steering the State Treasury, which is an additional complicating 
factor in the steering process. The objectives for the functions and the resources allocated 
to them do not come from the same channel, which is one of the key challenges in multi-
channel steering. 
3.4  General organisational model of the State Treasury 
The current organisational model of the State Treasury is described in Figure 12.14 The 
agency which originally had debt management as its sole task has, over the years, evolved 
into a multi-sectoral and development body, which in addition to traditional debt office 
duties also produces services for central government in the field of economy and human 
resources, manages central government bookkeeping, accident and indemnity insurance 
compensations, grants citizens compensations for military injuries and criminal damage, 
as well as administers the loans, interest subsidies and guarantees granted by the state. 
14  D9 means the digi-team set up in the State Treasury, which supports the implementation of digitalisation 
projects and speeds up the transformation of public services into customer-oriented processes utilising 
digitalisation.
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The debt management tasks are the responsibility of the State Treasury’s Finance Division, 
the duties of which are described in detail in section 3.5. 
Parallel to its core activities, the State Treasury also has support functions (Administration 
and Development, Internal Auditing and IT Management), which serve all divisions of 
the agency. The communications of the Finance Division is an exception to this. The 
Finance Division has a single expert who manages the communications tasks of the 
entire division. The same applies to IT Management. The State Treasury has a single IT 
management function, excluding the financial IT management, which is responsible for 
the maintenance and development of the core systems of the Finance Division. 
Figure 12. Organisational model of the State Treasury
Source: State Treasury. 
The sector-independent information technology services and solutions for the State 
Treasury are produced by a service agency operating under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Finance, which provides services for all central government actors. It has also administered 
the service agreement covering the systems of the State Treasury since 2014. The ICT 
architecture for debt management is the responsibility of the service agency, which 
provides the architecture as its own work or purchases it from a private contractual 
partner as a subcontracted service. Debt management does not have any direct 
ownership or steering control over the ICT solutions that it uses. 
At the end of 2017, the State Treasury had a staff of 299 (State Treasury’s annual report 
2017). Because the State Treasury is a development agency, there has been substantial 
variation in the number of employees over the years (between 300 and 1,000) as some of 
the agency’s original functions have been transferred elsewhere. The State Treasury has 
also been forced to undergo substantial operational restructuring in the past few years. 
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Strong annual variation in the agency’s staff numbers is a problem in debt management 
because debt management and its development  are long-term activities. 
Under the Act on the State Treasury (305/1991), the State Treasury is headed by the 
Director General. The Management Board assists the Director General in the strategic 
planning, management, supervision and operational development of the agency. In 
addition to the Director General, the Management Board also comprises the Heads of 
Divisions and a Personnel Representative. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for the 
external supervision of the State Treasury. External financial and performance audits of the 
agency are carried out by the National Audit Office of Finland. 
Under the Act on the State Treasury, the Director General has wide powers to decide on 
the activities of the agency and matters concerning it. In practice, however, some of the 
powers in core matters have been delegated to Heads of Divisions, a reflection of State 
Treasury’s role as a multi-sectoral agency. The State Treasury operates in a wide sector of 
fields and the matters coming under its responsibility require in-depth expertise, which is 
one argument in favour of delegated decision-making. 
Decisions on the allocation of the agency’s resources are made by its Director General 
within the budgetary framework granted by the Ministry of Finance. The ministry does 
not play any role in the allocation of resources between the agency’s divisions. With 
regard to investments, each of the State Treasury’s divisions prepares its own investment 
plan and the appropriations required for the purpose are included in the draft State 
Treasury budget submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The investments of the State 
Treasury are funded from the operational appropriations, except for the investments of 
the Financial and Personnel Administration Division, which are funded from separate 
appropriations. The State Treasury has a single investment budget from which the funding 
for all investment projects is allocated. Divisions must submit investment proposals 
to obtain new funding for their investments. In investments of more than EUR 60,000, 
the Development Director and the division in question first assess the feasibility of the 
project after which the Head of Division presents the project to the Management Board. 
The final decision on appropriating funds for the project is made by the Director General. 
In projects totalling less than EUR 60,000, the funding decision is made by the Head of 
Division.
From the perspective of debt management, the current investment model applied in the 
State Treasury and the multi-tier organisation of its ICT solutions do not optimally support 
the capacity of debt management to quickly react to changes in market conditions and 
the need for changes and improvements in the debt management ICT infrastructure 
arising from them. 
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3.5 Debt management as part of the State Treasury’s Finance 
Division 
The tasks of the State Treasury’s Finance Division are shown in Figure 13. The Finance 
Division is responsible for central government fundraising (see Box 5), liquidity 
management and the management of the interest rate risk associated with on-budget 
debt, cooperation between central government and credit rating agencies, and 
communications in this sector. These duties, which are marked in blue in Figure 13, 
constitute the debt office tasks included in the working group’s mandate. 
In addition to these tasks, the Finance Division is also responsible for interest equalisation 
portfolio management services associated with the export financing granted by the 
state, assignments carried out as part of the National Nuclear Waste Management Fund’s 
investment portfolio, and fundraising for Senate Properties. The Finance Division is also 
responsible for the tasks included in the collateral arrangements for Greece and Spain. 
B OX  5.  C E N T R A L  G O V E R N M E N T  F U N D I N G  S T R AT E G Y
In its funding, the State of Finland applies 
a borrowing strategy based on euro-
dominated benchmark bonds. The State of 
Finland aims to issue one or more new serial 
bonds every year, which, at the time of issue, 
immediately achieve the size, liquidity on 
the secondary market and sufficiently wide 
investor base required of the benchmark 
bond. Once the serial bonds have achieved 
benchmark bond status, the government’s 
primary dealer banks quote bid and ask 
prices for them.
For the initial issue of benchmark bonds, the 
State of Finland uses syndicated bond issues. 
This ensures that a new loan has a broad 
investor base and fosters price stability in the 
secondary market. The stock of outstanding 
benchmark bonds can be increased at a 
later date, through State Treasury auctions. 
In addition to benchmark bonds, the State 
of Finland can also issue long-term debt 
instruments in non-euro currencies. Under 
the framework of the Euro Medium Term 
Note programme, bonds can be issued in 
different currencies. The EMTN programme 
serves as a complementary form of funding 
augmenting the benchmark bond strategy. 
Treasury bills provide central government 
with a flexible, short-term funding channel. 
One year is the maximum maturity period 
for treasury bills. The State Treasury 
issues treasury bills throughout the year, 
depending on investor demand and liquidity 
requirements. 
In cash management, the key task is to 
maintain and secure central government’s 
liquidity management. Depending on the 
situation, the State Treasury can invest its 
cash funds or take out short-term loans from 
the financial markets.
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The Finance Division is also responsible for the management of central government 
lending, interest subsidies and government guarantees, as well as for economic 
restructuring of rental and right-of-occupancy housing corporations.15
The Finance Division has a staff of about 70 and about 30 of them work in the lending 
unit. Similarly to the State Treasury as a whole, the Finance Division has also been forced 
to adjust its personnel resources in accordance with tighter budgets in recent years. Most 
of the staff cuts have taken place in the lending unit, where the number of employees has 
decreased by 35 per cent since 2007.16
Figure 13. Operations and tasks of the State Treasury’s Finance Division
Source: State Treasury
At the same time, there has been a rapid increase in the Finance Division’s volume of 
operations and the risks associated with the work, while the challenges in the operating 
environment have become more complex. These are described in Chapter 2. In addition 
to the change factors in the operating environment highlighted in the chapter, the 
increasingly international operating environment of the Finance Division, in a situation 
where Finland is now a member of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has also 
15  The decisions on new loans are made by the National Housing Fund (ARA), while the decisions on problem 
credits are made by the State Treasury. At the moment, no fundraising is required for the lending because the 
National Housing Fund granting the loans has a surplus.
16  Most of the personnel reductions have been achieved through retirements and resignations and the absence of 
new recruitments.
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added to the expertise challenges facing the division’s staff. Most of the primary dealer 
banks used by the State Treasury and parties investing in Finland’s central government 
debt are foreign actors.17 
Comparisons between the staff numbers and operating volumes in the Finance Division, 
Finnvera, Municipality Finance and OP Group are given in Table 1. The asset items 
managed by these four financial institutions are very similar. The table shows that in 
relation to the size of its balance sheet, the Finance Division operates with fairly limited 
resources.18 
Table 1. Size of the State Treasury’s Finance Division in comparison with a number of other financial insti-
tutions
 State Treasury Finnvera Municipality 
Finance
OP Group
Loan portfolio, EUR billion 6 6 21 82
Guarantee and collateral portfolio, EUR billion 28 19 - -
Fundraising portfolio, EUR billion 106 7 30 35
New long-term fundraising, EUR billion 13 10 4
Liquidity portfolio, EUR billion 3 3 9 23
Balance sheet total, EUR billion 106 10 35 137
Personnel 68 357 119 12 269
Source: State Treasury, OP Group financial statements bulletin 2017, Finnvera Annual Report 2017, Municipality 
Finance Annual Report 2017
The Finance Division is supervised by the State Treasury’s internal audit, which collects 
information on the performance of individual divisions, reliability of the information 
that they produce, and compliance with the provisions governing their operations. 
Internal audit is headed by the State Treasury’s Director General to whom internal audit 
also reports on its observations. In this respect, the practice observed in the agency 
differs from the principle normally applied in the financial sector in which the critical 
observations made by the internal audit are reported directly to the body steering the 
function. 
The State Treasury’s internal audit also commissions operational audits from external 
consultants. The last such audit of the Finance Division was carried out in 2016 and it 
covered continuity management in central government debt transactions. In summer 
2018, the State Treasury also prepared its first long-term audit plan.
17  For more information on the primary dealer banks used by the State Treasury, click the link in Box 2. For an 
example of a benchmark bond issue and its investor base, see https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/en-US/Finland_
issued_new_benchmark_bond(58844).
18  In this comparison, the State Treasury’s balance sheet means the total amount of the central government debt 
and not the balance sheet in the traditional sense. 
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4  Organisation of debt management – 
international comparisons 
Experts of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have jointly prepared 
guidelines for an efficient administrative model for central government debt management 
(IMF 2014). In them, the emphasis is on a solid legislative framework and clear 
organisational arrangements in which different actors have clearly defined mandates so 
that overlaps in functions can be avoided. 
The guidelines prepared by international institutions also highlight the role of transparent 
and accountable debt management, which requires regular publication of information 
on the objectives, principles and strategies of debt management together with central 
government financing needs. 
The consensus in the debt management guidelines has been that the measures taken 
as part of central government debt management should be made the responsibility of 
a single administrative unit so that an efficient and well-coordinated debt management 
process can be ensured. At the same time, the views on the institutional location of the 
debt management measures have differed. 
In literature, debt management models have been roughly divided into three categories: 
debt management can be the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, the central bank 
or a separate debt management office.19 The different solutions applied by European 
countries in this respect are shown in Table 2. In most countries, the debt management 
office is part of the Ministry of Finance. There are also many countries with a separate debt 
management office. At the same time, only a small number of countries have made debt 
management a central bank responsibility. Denmark is the only EU country where debt 
management is a central bank function. Of the other Nordic countries, Iceland and Norway 
also use this model. 
19  The reality is, however, more complicated than this and other models also exist. For example in Spain, debt 
management is the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy and Business. 
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The Finnish model is not categorised in a uniform manner in all international surveys. 
The OECD is of the view that Finland has a debt management office that operates as a 
separate body but is nevertheless part of the Ministry of Finance. At the same time, in a 
report published by the European Central Bank in 2005, debt management in Finland is 
classified as a function located in the Ministry of Finance (Wolswijk and de Haan 2005). 
The fact that the ministry is responsible for the supervision of debt management and 
issues the guidelines for government debt management  was used as a justification for the 
categorisation.
International comparisons show that there is no superior solution in the organisation of 
debt management and that all models have their own strengths and weaknesses. 
Table 2. Organisation of central government debt management in European countries
Country Location of the debt office
Euro area countries
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Estonia
Finland
Separate office
Ministry
Ministry
Ministry
Partially separate office
France
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Ministry
Separate office
Separate office
Separate office
Ministry
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
The Netherlands
Separate office
Ministry
Ministry
Ministry
Ministry
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Separate office
Separate office
Ministry
Ministry
Non-euro countries
Bulgaria
Croatia
Czech Republic
Denmark
Hungary
Ministry
Ministry
Ministry
Central bank
Separate office
Poland
Romania
Sweden
United Kingdom
Ministry
Ministry
Separate office
Separate office
Other Nordic countries
Norway 
Iceland
Central bank
Central bank
 
Source: Sihvola (2017). 
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5  General description of the risks 
associated with debt management
The risks associated with debt management can be divided into market, financing, 
counterparty, operational and model risks. Market risk means the risk of economic losses 
arising from changes in exchange rates and interest rates. Central government does not 
take any currency risks in its borrowing as it hedges against them by means of derivative 
contracts (see Box 7). The interest rate risk (the key risk factor in debt management) and 
the way in which it is managed, are described in Chapter 6. 
Financing risk means the risk associated with the access to financing or the terms of 
financing. The risk may involve the threat of insolvency or higher debt expenses arising 
from exceptional market conditions or the downgrading of central government’s credit 
rating. Financing risk is divided into liquidity risk and refinancing risk. 
Liquidity risk means a situation where the sources of central government liquidity (such 
as the cash funds held in central government accounts in financial institutions and the 
invested on-budget and off-budget cash assets) are insufficient to cover all known central 
government payment obligations in a cost-efficient manner over the next 12 months. A 
financing risk extending beyond that point is called a refinancing risk.
A liquidity risk is managed by maintaining an invested liquidity buffer meeting known 
payment obligations and by issuing short-term debt. When investment decisions are 
made, priority is given to credit risk-free options (such as securitized instruments). Treasury 
bills are the prime source of short-term funding. The Ministry of Finance regulates the 
liquidity risk by setting limits on the size of forecasted uncovered payments. The State 
Treasury uses a cash forecasting system in liquidity management. 
With respect to liquidity, the views of the credit rating agencies concerning the ability 
and willingness of the State of Finland to manage its economic obligations is of key 
importance because investors use credit ratings when assessing the risks associated with 
their investments. Despite weak economic growth over the past few years and growing 
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central government debt, Finland’s credit rating has remained high.20 In its funding, the 
State of Finland mainly relies on medium-term (about five years) and long-term (about ten 
years) benchmark bonds. In order to manage the refinancing risk, these bonds are issued 
so that temporal risk concentrations can be avoided. The Ministry of Finance limits the 
refinancing risk by setting periodic maximum values for debts falling due. The purpose of 
this is to ensure that the cash flows associated with the debt are evenly distributed over 
the coming years. 
By means of interest rate swaps, the State Treasury can separate refinancing risk from 
interest rate risk. Using derivative contracts, the State Treasury can, when issuing bonds, 
focus on factors concerning market demand and the refinancing risk and consider 
the management of the interest rate risk separately. Box 7 in Chapter 6 describes how 
derivatives are used in the management of the interest rate risk.
Counterparty risk means the risk of losses arising from the insolvency of the contractual 
counterparty. The state may incur a counterparty risk as a result of derivative contracts, 
cash funds and invested liquidity. The aim in the management of counterparty risks is 
to minimise them. This is done by diversifying the counterparty risk among different 
counterparties, by requiring high credit ratings from the counterparties and by concluding 
securitized derivative contracts. 
Operational risks arise from inadequacies in operating practices, information systems, 
personnel or internal control. External threats and emergencies (such as power failures 
and cyber threats), as well as the legal risks associated with the danger of financial losses 
arising from non-compliance with laws, market practices and agreements can also be 
considered as operational risks.
The aim in the management of operational risks is to minimise them. The State Treasury 
does this by regularly reviewing debt management processes and systems. The State 
Treasury prepares debt management audit plans covering several years, reports on 
the findings of internal audits to the Ministry of Finance and takes corrective action if 
inadequacies in systems or operating practices are detected in the audits. 
The State Treasury’s Finance Division prepares for external threats and emergencies by 
drafting and maintaining appropriate continuity plans. The State Treasury also has secure 
facilities for debt management and arrangements ensuring their functioning. The aim in 
the continuity management is to ensure that the provision of critical debt management 
services is not endangered in normal conditions, in disruptions occurring in normal 
conditions or in unexpected situations requiring special measures. In its continuity plan, 
20  https://www.treasuryfinland.fi/en-US/Economy_and_credit_ratings/Credit_ratings
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the Finance Division has described the most critical tasks included in its functions, their 
dependencies and the manner in which they can be produced in all the situations referred 
to above. The plan covers the key debt management processes (liquidity management, 
funding and portfolio management), as well as their support processes. Operations in 
emergencies are outside the scope of the continuity plan. Operations in emergencies are 
laid out in the Ministry of Finance’s contingency plan. The services purchased from debt 
management service providers on a contractual basis for which the service providers 
prepare their own continuity plans are also outside the scope of the continuity planning. 
According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, a legal risk can be defined as 
a potential obligation arising from a supervisory measure or an illegal procedure to make 
the party in question accountable for its action. In practice, a legal risk often arises from 
non-compliance with legislation and market practices, non-implementation, invalidity, 
inadequate documentation or vagueness of agreements or decisions. When realised, a 
legal risk may lead to a situation where unspecified claims can be presented against a 
state or it may cause unexpected losses or make it less likely that the state can pursue its 
own claims. 
In order to minimise legal risks, the State Treasury follows developments in domestic and 
international legal operating environments so that it has the information on relevant 
legislation, case law and legislative projects that is required for debt management. As 
a rule, the State Treasury should also use commonly accepted master agreements.21 
For contractual management, the Finance Division has a register in which all funding 
agreements in effect have been entered. The State Treasury also minimises legal risks by 
observing strict counterparty credit rating criteria (which also reduces the counterparty 
risk) and by selecting large actors with a high degree of solvency as counterparties for risk 
management measures. 
As described in section 2.4, the pace of change in the legal operating environment has 
been rapid in the past few years, a result of increasing regulation. This has made legal risks 
a more significant factor in debt management. 
Model risk means the risk of financial losses arising from the use of models in debt 
management. The risk arises from erroneous or inadequate modelling, erroneous use of 
the models, or erroneous interpretation of their results. Model risks can be minimised 
by identifying model-related risks, by maintaining and developing modelling-related 
expertise and by ensuring detailed documentation of modelling-related matters. 
21  For example, when concluding derivative contracts, the State Treasury should use the ISDA Master Agreement 
and CSA standard agreement, while in repurchase agreements, the Global Master Repurchase Agreement should 
be used.
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6  Selecting strategic interest rate risk 
position and debt management model 
6.1 Selection of strategic interest rate risk position and 
modelling of interest rate risk – general observations
The understanding of the nature of public debt and the manner in which economic risks 
are perceived play a role when central government determines its strategic interest rate 
risk position. The generally accepted objective in the selection of the interest rate risk 
position is to minimise the costs of central government borrowing in the medium term or 
long term at the selected risk level. This objective is set out in the guidelines for managing 
general government debt prepared by the experts of the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank (IMF 2014). However, the concepts ‘expenses’ and ‘risk’ are not specifically 
defined in the guidelines. In fact, there is no commonly accepted practice or theoretical 
base for defining them. Defining risks and expenses is, however, of key importance when 
the results of an interest rate risk analysis are examined. 
As there are no universally applicable definitions for expenses and risks, the modelling of 
the interest rate risk position has to be based on principles that should be applied in the 
modelling process in general. Investability, accessibility, transparency and relevance are 
some of the general modelling principles often presented in literature (for example, Bacon 
and Riddles 2015).
Investability means that interest rate risk modelling should be based on instruments that 
are actually available in the market and that can also be used. Accessibility means that 
the data and methods used in modelling should be feasible and available. Transparency 
means that it should be possible to assess the modelling method and to compare it with 
potential alternatives. Relevance means that the modelling and the definitions used in it 
should be appropriate and generally acceptable in respect of the objectives laid out for the 
modelling. In accordance with this last-mentioned principle, the general view is that the 
state does not have any specific reasons to take visionary/speculative interest rate risks. 
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6.2 Current approach to the modelling of interest rate risk 
The modelling used by the State of Finland and the selection of the interest rate risk 
position founded on it are based on the market rate modelling carried out by the State 
Treasury and the simulation of the expenses arising from central government debt 
produced with the modelling. Simulated expenses are examined on a long-term basis 
(Box 6). The aim is to analyse the expenses and risks arising from different interest rate risk 
positions in the long term. The results of the model significantly depend on the baseline 
assumptions made (such as the selected time frame). The Ministry of Finance selects the 
risk position on the basis of the expense/risk ratios modelled by the State Treasury.22 23 24
B OX  6.  C U R R E N T  M O D E L L I N G  O F  C E N T R A L  G O V E R N M E N T  I N T E R E S T 
E X P E N S E S  A N D  R I S K S
When modelling interest expenses, the State 
Treasury  focuses on the interest expenses 
arising from on-budget net debt22. With 
respect to the debt coupon expenses, the 
State Treasury considers deferred costs, while 
in other areas (buy-backs and terminations), 
cash-based costs are examined. Risk is 
understood as a deviation from the average 
expenses of net on-budget debt, as calculated 
for a period of 15 years. 
In the model used, the calculation of expenses 
and risks is based on a situation where all 
components of the model are  in the long 
term equilibrium. In this situation, the interest 
rate probability distribution (and the shape 
of the yield curve) and the structure of the 
debt portfolio do not depend on the time of 
the examination. The period used as a basis 
for the calculation of expenses (15 years) 
together with the regression towards the 
mean character of the model, do, however, 
have an impact on the estimated expense/
risk ratios .23 Alternative debt management 
strategies are formulated  from the debt 
management instruments specified in the 
debt management guidance provided by the 
Ministry of Finance (see section 3.2) and from  
a separately specified debt portfolio created 
using them. Average expenses and risks are 
calculated for the portfolio using simulated 
interest rate data on a long-term basis. 
Determining efficient debt management 
strategies is based on traditional Markowitz 
optimisation.
The simulation  of the interest rate data is 
based on the primary component analysis 
model and the Nelson-Siegel method.24 These 
models are commonly used in the simulation 
of interest rate data. The interest rate models 
are calibrated using historical interest rate 
data. The State Treasury uses the monthly 
yields on the bonds issued by Germany  since 
1986 and swap yields since 1997.
22 Central government cash funds subtracted from on-budget debt.
23 In this process, the aim is to find the debt management strategies that minimise expected debt costs at a given 
risk level. In Markowitz optimisation, the combination of these debt management strategies is called the efficient 
frontier. On the efficient frontier, expected debt management costs can only be reduced by accepting a higher risk 
level.
24 The assumption in the principal component model is that the interest rate curve can be largely explained 
with a small number of factors (principal components). The State Treasury simulates principal components using 
stochastic differential equations. Read more about the Nelson-Siegel model at Nelson and Siegel (1987), and 
Diebold and Li (2006).
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Focusing on interest expenses and on changes in them may lead to a situation where the 
variation in on-budget interest expenses are minimised, resulting in unnecessarily high 
interest expenses. With the current central government debt and the difference between 
short-term and long-term interest rates, as examined in the long term, the average cost 
difference between interest rate risk positions is more than one billion euros. 
With respect to its time frame assumptions and the theoretical debt portfolio structure, 
the modelling used by the State Treasury differs from the modelling used by most other 
debt offices. In them the costs and risks are determined by prevailing interest rates and 
debt structures. 
Even though the interpretation of the internationally used models is connected with 
actual interest expenses, their results depend significantly on the shape of the yield curve 
on the analysis day, and the risk examination time frame. Actual interest expenses are 
emphasised because monitoring and forecasting of on-budget costs are key guiding 
factors for central government. 
Use of derivatives plays a key role in the management of market risks in the Finnish debt 
management model. They allow the separation of the interest rate risk and refinancing 
risk, so that the State Treasury is able to give better consideration to market demand when 
issuing debt. Use of derivatives in the management of market risks is described in Box 7.
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B OX  7.  U S E  O F  D E R I VAT I V E S  I N  T H E  M A N AG E M E N T  O F  M A R K E T  R I S K S
In the management of the market risk 
associated with central government 
borrowing, derivatives play a key role in the 
Finnish debt management model. Within 
the limits and restrictions set in the debt 
management guidance provided by the 
Ministry of Finance, the State Treasury uses 
derivative contracts (mostly interest rate and 
currency swaps). 
By using interest rate swaps, the State 
Treasury can, when issuing bonds, examine 
aspects concerning the interest rate risk 
separately and focus on market demand 
and refinancing risks. In other words, by 
using interest rate swaps, the State Treasury 
is able to adjust the interest rate risk profile 
of the central government bond portfolio 
separately from the financing risk. 
At the same time, with currency swaps, the 
state is able to hedge against fluctuations 
in exchange rates. For example, when 
issuing a dollar-denominated treasury bill, 
the state can simultaneously conclude a 
currency swap in which it receives payments 
in dollars and makes payments in euros. In 
accordance with the debt management 
instructions of the State Treasury, the State 
of Finland does not take any exchange rate 
risks in its borrowing. After hedging, all debt 
of the State of Finland is in euros.
Derivative contracts are constructed so 
that the market value of the contract is 
zero at the time of the establishment of the 
contractual relationship. However, the value 
of the contract changes as interest rates 
and exchange rates change. In a situation 
where the value of the derivative contract 
is positive from the Finnish perspective, the 
contract is associated with a counterparty 
risk. The State Treasury manages this risk 
with collateral. 
Since spring 2018, the State Treasury has 
had a mandate to conclude two-way 
collateral agreements (to receive and deliver 
collateral in derivative transactions). Before 
this, the State Treasury was only authorised 
to receive collateral in derivative activities. A 
changed market practice was a key reason 
for the changeover to the two-way collateral 
practice. Tighter financial market regulation 
has weakened the pricing of derivatives 
made under one-way collateral agreements. 
In fact, many countries have changed over 
to the two-way arrangement or central 
counterparty clearing, or are in the process 
of doing so. 
In accordance with general market practices, 
the State Treasury accepts treasury bills and 
cash collateral of countries and financial 
institutions with sufficient credit rating.
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6.3  Broad balance sheet perspective and modelling it
Balance sheet perspective provides an alternative approach to guide the selection of the 
central government interest rate risk position. Its aim is to find an answer to the question 
of what kind of interest rate risk position can best secure the balance between central 
government revenue and expenses. The theoretical basis of the balance sheet perspective 
is clear and it has been extensively studied in contexts outside central government 
debt management. It is connected with solvency and the problem of minimising the 
bankruptcy risk associated with it, which is used in banking and insurance sectors. The 
perspective taken in the balance sheet analysis is broader and, in a theoretical sense, 
more justified than an analysis that is solely based on variation in debt interest expenses. 
Furthermore, the balance sheet perspective is not particularly sensitive to baseline 
assumptions (such as the time frame selected). In fact, international organisations and 
a number of researchers have highlighted the need to examine the central government 
interest rate risk from a broader balance sheet perspective. 25 
With the balance sheet perspective, the examination covers both interest expenses 
and other balance sheet items (such as tax revenue). The aim is to achieve interest rate 
position, which will reduce fluctuations in central government primary balance and, 
consequently, will help to cut budgetary surpluses and deficits connected with economic 
cycles. For example, in an economic downturn, central government tax revenue decreases 
and this is often accompanied by a fall in market rates. Likewise, a rise in interest rates is 
not necessarily a risk to central government if its revenue also increases. 
The definitions of the balance sheet perspective are also in accordance with the general 
central government economic policy goals and support their achievement. These 
include the deficit target set out in the EU treaties and the closing of the sustainability 
gap, an objective set out by the Government. It is also known that credit institutions and 
investors assess the total central government balance sheet when making their credit and 
investment decisions.
The simplest way of applying the balance sheet perspective would be to include both the 
variation in interest expenses and the variation in central government tax revenue in the 
models used. It would be natural to do this by using existing models, such as the Kooma 
model of the Ministry of Finance or the Aino model of the Bank of Finland. 
Even though a number of institutions consider the balance sheet analysis in their 
recommendations, it is not yet extensively used in any country. New Zealand has 
25 For example, OECD (2005), IMF (2011), IMF (2014) and Blommenstein & Koc Kalkan (2008). 
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advanced furthest on the balance sheet approach path but its analysis also leaves out the 
tax revenue, which is the most important central government income category (Koc 2014). 
Many reasons have been given for the low popularity of the balance sheet analysis. One 
such factor is the technical complexity of the approach, which makes the dissemination 
of the modelling results a challenging process. The limited amount of practically oriented 
research information on the balance sheet approach has also been given as a factor 
preventing more widespread use of the approach. 
Operationalisation of the balance sheet approach would require close coordination 
between the institutions that are involved in the management of central government 
liabilities and assets, something that would probably require institutional changes. This 
could be one obstacle to more widespread use of the balance sheet analysis. 26
In countries with their own currency, the use of the balance sheet analysis is often 
prevented by obstacles arising from the role of the central bank and price stability. In that 
case, in order to strengthen the independence of the central bank and the credibility of 
the price stability objective, the policy is to keep the management of central government 
liabilities separated from the management of central government assets (see for example, 
Cassard and Folkerts-Landau 1997).
 
26 In practice, however, modelling of tax revenue is sufficient because it accounts for most of central government 
income. In this case, operationalisation of the balance sheet analysis would not require institutional coordination.
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7  Observations of the working group 
7.1 General observations 
In accordance with its mandate, the working group has examined the target setting 
in central government debt management, a debt management model based 
on the benchmark portfolio, risks inherent in debt management and governing 
them, institutional organisation of the debt management, and the steering of debt 
management. In its work and conclusions, the working group has used reports and studies 
on the topic and heard the views of a large number of experts. 
The working group is of the view that debt management is a critical central government 
function that must be secured in all circumstances. Efficient debt management safeguards 
central government liquidity and ensures that central government borrowing needs can 
also be met in difficult times. This in turn helps to maintain room for manoeuvre in fiscal 
policy. 
The working group is also of the opinion that the current overall target setting in central 
government debt management, in which the aim is to cover on-budget borrowing 
needs and to minimise debt-related expenses in the long term at acceptable risk levels, 
is justified in the current situation. It has generally become the key objective in central 
government debt management in Finland’s reference countries and it is also in accordance 
with good debt management practices.
Furthermore, the working group does not see any need to change the overall division of 
labour in central government debt management, in which, based on parliamentary and 
government authorisation, the debt office takes care of the operational debt management 
tasks within the strategic steering framework provided by the Ministry of Finance. In 
good international practices, the emphasis is on the clear definition of the mandates of 
different actors and the concentration of the operative aspects of debt management in 
a single administrative unit. The overall division of labour in central government debt 
management is in accordance with these principles.
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The working group is also of the view that there are no major problems in the steering of 
the key aspects of debt management between the Ministry of Finance’s Financial Markets 
Department and the debt office. The role of the debt management guidance as a steering 
instrument is considered to work properly and it is prepared in close cooperation between 
the Financial Markets Department and the debt office. 
With respect to the process of selecting the strategic interest rate risk position for the 
debt, the working group considers the current model-based approach in the examination 
of expense/risk ratios of optional strategic interest rate risk positions as justified. From 
these options, the Ministry of Finance selects the strategic interest rate risk position that is 
in accordance with its risk preferences. Determining risk preferences thus plays a key role 
from the perspective of on-budget entities. Examining the expense/risk ratios of interest 
rate risk positions does not require that views should be taken on future interest rate 
trends at each point of time.
With respect to the interest rate risk analysis, the working group states that in the current 
approach, consideration is given to the interest rate sensitivity of the interest expenses 
arising from the net debt comprising the debt and cash funds. According to the analysis, 
decreasing the risk always means increases in expected costs. For this reason, there are 
good grounds for selecting any interest rate risk position on the basis of the current 
analysis. In economic terms, the decision is highly important because with current debt 
volumes, there may be differences of up to one billion euros in expected annual costs 
under different strategies. 
The decision on the strategic interest rate risk can be justified by using exclusively the 
restrictions of the current analysis. In that case, reducing variation in on-budget interest 
expenses is an important argument for the decision. In an alternative approach, the aim 
is to reduce the variation in budgetary surpluses and deficits  by means of managing the 
interest rate risk so that  such factors as covariation in the interest rates and tax revenue 
is taken into account. In the working group’s opinion, the impacts of the latter approach 
should also be assessed. 
The working group is of the view that the  refinancing risk is properly managed. The 
purpose of central government borrowing is to meet the central government funding 
requirements in a cost-efficient manner and in a manner that ensures access to financing 
in all circumstances. In order to ensure this, the debt office diversifies its borrowing with 
respect to maturity, instruments and investor base. 
Long-term central government borrowing is based on the system of central government 
benchmark bonds. The debt office regularly issues benchmark bonds through primary 
dealer banks. These banks also maintain the secondary market for benchmark bonds. In 
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the working group’s view, from the perspective of ensuring successful borrowing, the debt 
office should continue to maintain close contacts with the investors investing in Finland’s 
central government debt and with credit rating agencies. 
Short-term central government funding is based on the issuing of treasury bills. The 
working group is of the opinion that treasury bills are an efficient and flexible instrument 
to ensure central government liquidity. In order to ensure the liquidity, the State Treasury 
also maintains the central government’s cash buffer. Cash management is based on a cash 
forecasting system administered by the debt office, in which the revenue and expenditure 
forecasts of all central government accounting units are entered. In the working group’s 
view, the cash forecasting system is in accordance with the best international practices, 
and it allows effective management of the liquidity risk. 
The working group is of the opinion that in its own area of responsibility, the debt 
office has properly maintained and developed resilience and continuity management 
of debt management. Debt management has been provided with secure facilities and 
the workability of the facilities is tested on a regular basis. A comprehensive continuity 
plan, which has been properly maintained and updated, has also been prepared for debt 
management. However, it has not been possible to implement all measures enhancing the 
resilience of the information systems in the desired manner in cooperation with the ICT 
service agency. 
The working group is satisfied with the manner in which legal risks are managed. 
Legal risks are minimised in debt management by using commonly accepted master 
agreements and by carefully selecting the counterparties on the basis of strict criteria.
7.2 Critical observations 
The most important critical observations of the working group are as follows:
1. In the working group’s opinion, the organisation of the debt office 
within the multi-sectoral State Treasury is problematic. The debt 
office has few synergies with the other functions of the State 
Treasury, which are very different in terms of their nature and target-
setting, compared with the tasks of the debt office.27 
27 In addition to managing the traditional tasks of a debt office, the State Treasury’s Finance Division is also 
responsible for the management of the loans and guarantees provided by the State of Finland and a number of 
other financing services. The working group noted that these tasks are not core tasks of the debt office and, in 
terms of risk management, they differ significantly from the duties of a debt office. At the same time, the debt office 
and lending use the same risk control, ICT and financial communications. The working group is of the opinion that 
in any organisational changes, the relationship between the debt office and the other tasks of the Finance Division 
should be carefully examined.
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In the working group’s view, the multi-sectoral agency model 
brings benefits in administrative efficiency when all its functions 
have a similar objective function  and when the ICT infrastructure 
and administrative needs of its functions are sufficiently similar. 
According to the working group, the current model of the State 
Treasury does not meet these prerequisites. The objectives and ICT 
infrastructure needs of the debt office are substantially different 
from the needs of the State Treasury’s other divisions. 
In the working group’s opinion, the current setting in the State 
Treasury, where one function (debt office) is significantly more criti-
cal than the other functions potentially increases the total operating 
costs at least through two channels. First of all, the higher quality of 
the ICT services required by the debt office may (unnecessarily) also 
lead to stricter requirements in other functions. Secondly, due to the 
nature of the debt office’s operations, its staff members are requi-
red to possess expertise that is relatively rare in central governme-
nt, and in recruiting situations, the debt office has to compete with 
other financial sector actors. The higher salaries paid to debt office 
personnel will over time also put pressure on the State Treasury to 
introduce pay increases in other divisions. 
2. The working group sees major problems in the State Treasury’s 
current multi-channel steering model.28  In the general performance 
guidance process, the tasks of the State Treasury are seen as parallel 
even though they are actually very different in nature. The steering 
system is further complicated by the role of the State Treasury as a 
multi-sectoral agency that, in addition to the Ministry of Finance, is 
also steered by other ministries. 
One key problem with the current steering system is that the 
objectives and requirements laid out for the debt office do not 
come from the same channel as the resources for the work and 
that these two have become increasingly separated over the years. 
In such a structure, only limited consideration can be given to the 
special requirements and development needs of the debt office. The 
matter has also been highlighted in an internal audit covering the 
entire Finance Division carried out by an external party.
28 In the report on the general performance guidance of the State Treasury that was produced in the Ministry of 
Finance in spring 2018, it was also concluded that the steering of the State Treasury is a complicated process and 
that the State Treasury is the only agency in the administrative branch of the Ministry of Finance that is subject to 
performance guidance by more than one department.
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The problems of the multi-channel steering system have also been 
reflected in the implementation of the recommendations for the 
Finance Division presented in the internal audit. Taking the required 
measures is made more difficult by the State Treasury’s general 
steering system in which prioritisation of matters takes place 
between different needs. 
3. The working group notes that the reporting on internal audit 
observations in the Finance Division is not in accordance with the 
one-over-one principle commonly applied in the financial sector. 
The observations are first reported to the Director General and not 
to the steering body (Ministry of Finance). 
4. The working group notes that even though the overall debt 
management operating environment has become more challenging 
as a result of technological advances, stricter regulation and 
increasingly complicated financial markets, and that a rapid growth 
in debt and  contingent central government liabilities has increased 
debt management risks, the resources of the Finance Division have 
remained the same. 
The scarcity of resources was also highlighted in the internal audit 
carried out by the external party. The working group is of the 
opinion that in order to be able to respond to the requirements 
posed by an increasingly complicated operating environment, 
debt management must be provided with adequate resources for 
its processes, the development of its ICT architecture, continuity 
management and preparedness so that operational risks can be 
minimised. 
5. The working group sees major problems in the organisation of debt 
management ICT solutions. The ICT solutions for the State Treasury 
were originally produced from the perspective of the agency as a 
whole and its operating expenses. In this approach, ICT has been 
seen as a centralised support function. 
For many of the State Treasury’s functions, this is a workable 
solution. In debt management, however, ICT is part of a critical core 
function of central government. Debt management takes place in 
real time and the response times may only amount to a few hours. 
Moreover, financial market and debt management processes are 
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also highly digitalised. These factors set high requirements for the 
debt management ICT infrastructure. In recent years, the strategic 
significance of the ICT infrastructure has been further enhanced by 
technological advances. 
The sector-independent information technology services and 
solutions for the State Treasury are provided by a service agency 
operating under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance. The service 
agreements covering the State Treasury’s systems (servers and 
data networks) and work stations have also been outsourced to 
the service agency. The user services for central government debt 
management systems are produced in the service agency or the 
agency has outsourced them to a private company. Under the 
current model, the State Treasury is unable to directly supervise the 
activities of the service agency’s contractual partner in such areas 
as transaction and liquidity management services, as these are the 
responsibility of the service agency. The delivery times of the service 
agency providing ICT services are long compared to the critical debt 
management response times. 
The service agency has to be contacted if problems arise, which 
causes delays in the problem-solving process. The same applies 
to development and investment projects in debt management’s  
ICT infrastructure that the service agency produces on the basis 
of its own service strategy. Development and investment projects 
must also compete with development projects of other State 
Treasury divisions, which also causes delays and increases the risks 
concerning the implementation of the projects.
The working group is of the view that the current organisation and 
administration of the debt management ICT solutions constitute a 
clear operational risk to central government debt management. 
6. During its assignment, the working group has been provided with 
a report on a broader balance sheet approach for an analysis  of the  
interest rate risk and the strategic interest rate risk position. 
The working group is of the opinion that from a theoretical perspe-
ctive, the balance sheet analysis has several advantages and consi-
ders it an interesting approach to the management of the interest 
rate risk. The working group notes, however, that New Zealand is the 
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only country where the balance sheet analysis approach is extensi-
vely used. In the working group’s opinion, a changeover to a broa-
der-based balance sheet analysis approach would require further 
analysis. 
7. The working group is of the view that the methods used by the 
debt office in the calculation of the expense/risk ratios of different 
interest rate risk positions are commonly used and acceptable. 
The working group notes, however, that the yield curve estimation 
method used by the debt office does not take into account the 
zero lower bound. In the prevailing interest rate environment, this 
is a methodological shortcoming that may have an impact on the 
estimation results of the relationship between interest expenses 
and their variance. 
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8  Recommendations of the working group 
Based on its critical observations that are presented above, the working group makes the 
following proposals for developing risk management and steering of debt management: 
1. Debt management and the steering of central government 
transactions should be organisationally separated from other 
State Treasury tasks that do not have clear synergies with debt 
management duties. They should be made the responsibility of a 
separate agency or a separate unit in the Ministry of Finance. Of the 
other tasks currently managed by the State Treasury, the steering of 
central government transactions could be made part of the agency’s 
debt management function because this function is the principal 
user of the service. With the transfer, the management of the key 
central government banking relations would be the responsibility 
of a single function. The decisions on the detailed organisational 
model and the tasks of the debt management function would be 
made by the Ministry of Finance. When correctly implemented, the 
proposed organisational models would strengthen the profile of 
the central government debt management function as a financial 
market actor meeting the highest international standards. 
At the same time, the steering of the debt office should be made in-
to a single-channel process in which the Ministry of Finance would 
continue to decide on the debt management strategy and provide 
the debt office with a budgetary framework. The objectives of the 
debt office and the resources for achieving them would be set by 
the same entity . The debt office should have a more direct owner-
ship and control over the ICT architecture that it uses (work stations, 
data communications, servers, external services and contractual ma-
nagement).
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2. The working group is of the opinion that, as applicable, the 
governance principles commonly used in the financial sector should 
also be used in the governance of the debt office. The debt office 
should have an audit committee with a mandate to assess the risk 
management of and reporting on debt management and whether 
these are comparable with the standards commonly applied 
in the financial sector. The audit committee should comprise 
representatives of the ministry and external financial sector experts. 
Ultimately, implementing the recommendations made by the 
audit committee would remain the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance. 
3. The working group considers it important that advanced methods 
are used in the estimation of the interest rate risk and that the 
methods are regularly reviewed. Financial research experts should 
take part in the review process. First, the relevance of taking into 
account  the zero lower bound in  the estimation of the interest rate 
risk and expected interest expenses, should be analysed. 
4. According to the working group, there are several aspects in a broad 
balance sheet approach to central government risk management 
that are interesting and worth supporting. However, the working 
group is of the view that there is not yet enough information 
available on the balance sheet approach so, therefore, it would 
be too early to take steps towards it in central government risk 
management. The working group recommends that it should be 
examined to what extent a central government-level balance sheet 
approach would be feasible and realistically possible. Studying the 
experiences of a balance-sheet-based  approach gathered in other 
countries should also be included in the work.
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